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*
 
Much has been written identifying property price effects of historic preservation policies. Little 
attention has been paid to the possible policy endogeneity in hedonic price models. This 
paper outlines a general case of land use regulation in the presence of externalities and then 
demonstrates the usefulness of the model in an instrumental-variables estimation of a 
hedonic price analysis – with an application to historic preservation in Chicago. The 
theoretical model casts doubt on previous results concerning price effects of preservation 
policies. The comparative statics identify some determinants of regulation that seem, on the 
face of it, most unlikely to also belong in a hedonic price equation. The analysis employs 
these determinants as instruments for endogenous regulatory treatment in a hedonic price 
analysis. OLS estimation of the hedonic offers results consistent with much of previous 
literature, namely that property values are higher for historic landmarks. In the 2SLS hedonic, 
robust estimates of the “own” price effect of historic designation are shown to be large and 
negative (approx. -27%) for homes in landmark districts. Further, significant and substantively 
important (positive) external price effects of landmark designations are found. The paper 
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* This document contains demographic information from Geolytics™ East Brunswick New Jersey. I. Introduction  
The preservation of historic properties and districts is an increasingly popular form of land-
market intervention, especially for local governments.  Federally, the National Register of 
Historic Places (NRHP) comprises over 1.4 million buildings and objects on over 80,000 listed 
properties.
1  More locally, over 2,000 local historic district commissions exist in the U.S., many 
arising after the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966.  Such policies are typically justified 
on the grounds of preserving beneficial external effect of historical properties.  Other benefits 
often cited include stabilizing local land markets and conferring subsidies to historic property 
owners.   
 
Attempts to quantify the costs of such policies have centered on the price effects of historical 
protection on the “protected” properties.  A handful of studies have attempted to estimate spatial 
spillovers.  These studies, however, have all been plagued by the endogeneity of the protection, 
where higher quality or exemplar historic properties (and districts) tend to receive special 
regulatory protection.  The problem of endogenous policy treatment poses a challenge to those 
using hedonic price methods in other contexts as well.  The sizable literature on the economics of 
historic preservation has generally found a positive price effect for officially designated historic 
buildings, often quite large, while lacking a substantive theory to explain why that might be case.  
Historic preservation advocates often cite these studies despite the absence of a formal model of 
the regulators in this context and the inability of these price effects to be interpreted causally.  
The present analysis addresses both of these shortcomings. 
 
                                                 
1 From the National Register of Historic Places Official Website (http://www.nps.gov/nr/about.htm).  For additional 
discussion, see Schuster (2002) and Swaim (2003). 
   We first outline a general case of land use regulation in the presence of externalities.  Then, we 
demonstrate the usefulness of the model in an instrumental-variables estimation of a hedonic 
price analysis – with an application to historic preservation in Chicago.  The model of 
restrictions on development, owing to concerns about externalities caused by existing 
developments, identifies theoretical conditions leading to the regulatory takings.  The analysis 
employs these determinants as instruments for endogenous regulatory “treatment” in a hedonic 
price analysis.  This approach demonstrates the importance of addressing endogenous policy 
variables in standard hedonic approaches.  It also controls directly for historical quality by using 
the novel Chicago Historical Resources Survey, another innovation in the literature. 
 
II.  Background 
 
Governments at the local, state, and federal level implement a variety of policy tools in the name 
of historic preservation.  These policies typically target historic objects, buildings, or districts.   
These policies typically reflect multiple objectives like actual preservation of cultural resources, 
local economic development, and compensation of private preservation efforts.  Officially 
designated landmarks and heritage resources can enjoy a form of “certification of quality” by 
government authorities, various forms of marketing by public agencies, subsidized capital and 
operating expenses, special public services such as public transit tours, and other advantages 
designed to promote tourism.  Some preservation policies also involve government caretaking or 
owning of resources, in the form of public museums, monuments, or parks.   
 
 The imposition of binding restrictions on private property owners is largely a local affair.  
Federal regulations (e.g., National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, Antiquities Act of 1906) 
are either voluntary, subsidy-based, or primarily deployed in the context of federally owned 
   property.  Many state and local preservation policies give teeth where the federal rules have few.  
This paper considers the city of Chicago where, since 1968, the Commission on Chicago 
Landmarks has recommended landmark designations to the City Council.  The stated purposes of 
the ordinance cover a wide range of topics like preservation, urban renewal, tourism, welfare, 
and character.  By April 2008, 259 individual landmarks and 50 historic districts (comprising 
over 9,000 properties) had been designated.  (42 individual landmarks, 7 districts, and roughly 
4,500 included properties were added between 2005 and 2008).  It is important to note that 
designation is not voluntary and property owners can appeal designation on hardship grounds.  
Once designated, alterations or construction affecting the landmark must be reviewed and 
approved by the Commission (part of the city’s Department of Planning and Development).  The 
City also offers several financial incentives for landmark property owners, depending on the type 
of landmark property.  For instance, owner-occupied residences can receive waivers of building 
permit fees and a 12-year freeze on property taxes.   
 
With such numerous objectives, evaluating the effectiveness of the policy poses a serious 
challenge.  Establishing the counterfactual (i.e., what would happen in the absence of the policy) 
is complicated by the heterogeneous implementation and the possibility that policy treatments 
depend on outcome variables.  For example, evaluating the effect of designation on a property’s 
sale price becomes complicated when designations “follow the market” (Schaeffer and Millerick 
1991) and merely reflect the additional value already recognized in the market, when 
designations promote urban renewal by targeting areas already in decline, or perhaps both at 
different times.  Making causal inferences about the effects of preservation policies by merely 
observing how outcomes correlate with designation is thus quite problematic.   
 
   Insofar as preservation policies restrict property use, property values can be expected to decline 
and sales prices would reflect this.  A negative marginal price in a hedonic analysis would reflect 
this kind of takings.  On the other hand, access to financial assistance, such as subsidized loans 
or fee exemptions, should increase property values and hence prices.  The effect of merely 
honorific designation on prices is less straightforward, possibly having no effect or perhaps 
conferring cachet or generating higher visibility to designated properties.   
 
Other, more external impacts may be expected as well.  If preservation policies or landmark 
designation bring more stability to a neighborhood by restricting changes in buildings or 
neighborhood character, property prices may rise because such stability mitigates investment risk 
for property owners.  Landmark designation and historic preservation may also yield rather 
intangible benefits to the community – which might be reflected in property prices.  Ahlfeldt and 
Maennig (forthcoming) argue that preservation policies conserve the “fabric of built heritage” 
and add value by producing variety.  Asabere and Huffman (1994b) suggest that historic 
preservation policies may solve a market failure in “providing a sense of unity with the past,” a 
public good.  Landmark designation may strengthen the “social fabric” of a community, 
enhancing local property values and prices (New York Landmarks Conservancy 1977).  
Schaeffer and Millerick (1991) noted how historic designation can indicate “public commitment” 
to the neighborhood.  Numerous other observers cite landmark designation policies as 
“catalyzing” rehabilitation of neighboring communities (Listokin et al. 1998, Coulson and 
Leichenko 2001, Rypkema 1994). 
 
   Mason (2005) reviews a sizable literature estimating impacts of historic preservation policies – 
usually focusing on price impacts.
2  Many studies find evidence to support strong and positive 
impacts of these policies and fuel local efforts for still more.  Recent studies have measured price 
premiums using a repeat-sales hedonics methodology (Coulson and Lahr 2005, Noonan 2007).  
The repeat-sales method suffers from possible sample selection bias and the possibility that 
appreciation rates affect the likelihood of designation.  Unfortunately, designations are hardly 
exogenous to property values, especially when improving or protecting land values is ostensibly 
one of the goals of the policy intervention.  Ideally, the empirical approach would correct the 
impact estimates for the bias resulting when the expected impacts affect the likelihood and type 
of policy intervention.  This analysis uses a simple model to explain which areas receive the 
intervention and integrates several data sources to instrument for the endogenous policy variable 
in the hedonic price equation.  This formal economic model of the determinants of historic 
preservation policymaking will be the first of its kind as far as we know.  The first-stage 
estimates of determinants of designations offer valuable insights into the economics of local real 
estate regulation.   Accordingly, the 2SLS estimator offers more robust evidence of causal (price) 
impacts historic preservation policies than most previous studies’ methods and data permit. 
 
III.  Theoretical Model 
In order to get consistent estimates of the policy effect of preservation policy, we attempt an 
instrumental variables estimation.  In order to motivate this approach, we develop a simple 
model of the designation process.  We imagine a historic preservation regulator maximizing his 
administrative utility function with respect to the restrictiveness of his preservation interventions, 
                                                 
2 Interestingly, the prominent impact studies by economists and preservationists alike focus on price impacts and 
economic development impacts – not on impacts on historic resources actually preserved.  
   r, which we treat as continuous.
3  The regulator has direct preferences over r and the utilities of 
the property owner (P) and of other affected stakeholders or neighbors (N).  Thus, the regulator 
will choose the restrictiveness of his intervention into the property market (his preservation 
policy) in order to maximize: 
  ,         ( 1 )   () ()() ( ;; , ; urz UPrz Nrz rz = ) , ;
                                                
where UN, UP > 0 and Ur < 0.  The regulator’s utility is rising in the welfare of the (regulated) 
property owner and in the welfare of the neighbors.  This is the case because he cares about high 
property values or because residents apply political and administrative pressure on the regulator 
to increase their own utility.  The regulator balances the property owner’s and neighbors’ 
opposing interests in restrictiveness.  Property owners prefer to have fewer restrictions (Pr < 0) in 
order to preserve the option of redevelopment.
4  Neighbors favor more restrictions (Nr > 0), 
assuming those restrictions do not restrict their own options.  Neighbors are expected to value 
restrictions on nearby properties because this reduces the risk of attractive properties being 
redeveloped in undesirable ways.  The regulator’s direct preferences over the restrictiveness arise 
from administrative costs of the program such as the costs of monitoring and enforcing 
compliance, as well as the administrator’s internalization of the subsidies or tax breaks that local 
regulation stipulates be provided as compensation to owners of restricted properties.  The direct 
preferences over the exogenous factors z will not be important to the model because they are not 
choice variables for the administrator.
5  The role of exogenous z will become important below.   
 
3 Obviously, preservation status is discrete.  Noonan and Krupka (2008) deal with this aspect of policy explicitly.  
Generally, the “restrictiveness” can be thought of as a continuous latent variable that includes the degree of curtailed 
transformation rights and stringency of enforcement that makes r appear continuous in practice even if designation 
status itself is dichotomous. 
4 The regulation might compensate restricted owners with subsidies or signal their property’s quality to potential 
buyers.  However, owners would prefer to have these advantages without the restrictions.   
5 These exogenous factors will include characteristics of individual properties, owners, or neighborhoods and will be 
discussed below.  The preferences over z will vary depending on which exogenous factor is considered.   
    
 The regulator optimizes by setting the marginal utility of restrictiveness to zero: 
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For interior solutions, equation (2) holds at the optimum and thus implicitly defines r
* as a 
function of z.  We assume that the second-order condition (that Fr < 0) is satisfied so that 
equation (2) implicitly defines r
*(z) as the utility-maximizing level of restrictiveness.  The partial 
effects of any of these exogenous characteristics on the optimal level of restriction, r
*, are thus: 
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where  < 0 is implied by the assumption that the second-order condition 
is satisfied.
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Equation (3) helps us understand how independent variation in a host of exogenous 
neighborhood or property characteristics will affect the optimal level of restrictiveness.  In 
general, such a factor will increase the level of restrictiveness whenever  P rz N rz rz UP UN U ++ > 0, 
which means that it increases the marginal utility of restrictiveness.  The term is basically the 
sum of the effect of z on the marginal utilities of each stakeholder, weighted by the regulator’s 
weight of each stakeholder’s utility.  For a variable z to be a valid instrument in a hedonic price 
model, it must have a non-zero effect in equation (3), but not affect property values.
7  This 
implies that Pz = Prz = 0, while Nrz and Urz do not both equal zero.  That is, neighbors and 
regulators might “care” about the factor, but owners and potential buyers will not care.   
                                                 
6 A sufficient condition for this condition to hold are that administrative costs increase more-than-linearly, that the 
added benefit to neighbors is decreasing in restrictiveness, and that the costs imposed on property owners by 
restrictions increases about linearly.  
7 This condition holds even under other regulator objective functions, such as on that sets UP very close or equal to 
zero as Glaeser (2006) suspects describes the Landmarks Preservation Commission in New York.  
    
The historic nature of the property will obviously not serve as such an instrument.  While 
neighbors might like the external effects of the historic quality (Nz > 0), owners might either find 
the outdated structure onerous (Pz < 0) or quaint (Pz > 0).  More restrictions on historic properties 
will increase neighbors’ utility (Nrz ≥ 0, because reduced uncertainty about the persistence of the 
positive externalities will benefit risk-averse neighbors) but could make living in a historic 
property worse (Prz < 0, because modifications will be more difficult).  From the above, it is 
apparent that historic quality serves as a poor instrument for preservation: it has an indeterminate 
effect on preservation, and likely has a direct effect on housing prices.  Similarly, neighborhood 
demographic characteristics will likely affect both preservation decisions and housing prices in 
the neighborhood.  
 
While neither historic quality nor neighborhood demographics will likely serve as valid 
instruments for historic designation, the interaction of them likely will.  Neighborhood 
demographics that increase the benefits from designation when historic externalities are present 
will increase the likelihood that a historic property is formally designated.  For instance, more 
owner-occupied units in the neighborhood (recipients of district tax breaks) will increase the 
likelihood that historic neighborhoods will be preserved, while having little effect on the 
probability that newer neighborhoods are so preserved.  Conversely, having more owner-
occupants in the area in 1970 will not affect the utility or disutility for owners in the 1990s of 
living near outdated properties.  The identification assumption is thus that z is some vector of 
interactions between the historic quality of the property being sold or its environs and key 
neighborhood demographics circa 1970.  Such interactions are assumed to have no effect on 
owner utility (Pz = Prz = 0), but important effects on neighbor utility (Nrz > 0).  The 
   reasonableness of assuming these interactions (i.e., supply and demand “shifters” for 
designation) do not belong in a hedonic price equation is further supported by including the 
uninteracted historical quality, historic density, and various current neighborhood demographics 
in the hedonic and in using lagged neighborhood demographics measured decades before the 
property sale.  Nonetheless, relevant diagnostic tests for instrument validity are still warranted. 
 
A feature of historic preservation policy in Chicago and elsewhere is that protected properties 
can be bundled together into landmark districts.  This is a detail away from which we have 
abstracted considerably.  Landmark districts offer regulators another policy instrument for 
making preservation decisions.  The decision to include a property in a landmark district, 
however, still follows a similar structure as that outlined above.  Administrative costs associated 
with a building in a district, along with the attendant internal and external effects, are likely to 
differ from individual designation decisions.  Despite these differences, the same factors, z, 
discussed above can serve as instruments for either type of designation.  Due to data limitations, 
this analysis emphasizes the district designations. 
 
IV.  Data and Method 
 
The following analysis combines data from many sources.  First, property data come from actual 
sales data recorded in the Multiple Listing Service (MLS) for all single-family attached 
residential property sales in the city of Chicago during the 1990s.  This type of property 
composed the bulk of property sales (and roughly 75% of the housing units) in the city at the end 
of our data period, and the MLS serves as the information clearinghouse for most arms-length 
housing sales in the city.  The data include 71,275 attached home sales in Chicago from 1990 – 
1999.  MLS tracks many property attributes such as the address, numbers and types of rooms, 
   and parking availability.  For the square footage and year built variables, which are missing in 
many observations, several fixes are considered.  Ultimately, for simplicity and because Noonan 
(2007) shows negligible gains for more sophisticated approaches, simple imputation based on the 
exogenous variables listed in Table 1 is employed.
8  List-wise deletion takes care of missing 
values for other variables in the regressions that follow.  The final sample used is slightly less 
than 60,000. 
 
Second, the City of Chicago’s Landmarks Division in the Department of Planning and 
Development provide information on the landmarks (City of Chicago 2004).  Information such 
as the addresses, dates of construction and designation, architect and architectural style, and 
historic themes are available for the individual landmarks and historic districts in the city.  
Added to the official landmarks data is the Chicago Historical Resources Survey (CHRS).  
Starting in 1983, historians from the Landmarks Commission inventoried the half million 
properties in Chicago’s city limits.  The survey report describes the methodology in greater detail 
(Commission on Chicago Landmarks 1996).  Ultimately, field work obtained detailed 
information from a final sample of 17,366 historically significant properties.  The database of 
CHRS properties contains information on addresses, architects, significance and maintenance, 
and construction dates (http://www.cityofchicago.org/Landmarks/CHRS.html).  The CHRS 
surveyors also assessed each CHRS property for its historic value or integrity.  Very significant 
and well preserved properties were given codes of either red or orange.  Sold properties thus fall 
into one of three categories depending on whether the sold property is a CHRS red or orange 
property (RO), is given lesser historical quality codes (OTH) but is still significant enough to be 
in the CHRS, or it was overlooked by the CHRS.  Table 1 shows the overlap between the MLS 
                                                 
8 Missing values for “square footage” and “year built” are imputed using several auxiliary regressions following the 
same approach used in Noonan (2007).  
   attached-home sales in the CHRS database and the properties designated as landmarks.  
Obviously, Chicago’s landmark designating process involves more than just historical quality, 
especially for district designation. 
Table 1: Overlap between CHRS and Landmark Designations in Sales Data 
    Is a landmark     







 “red” or “orange” 176  548  1,685  2,409  In CHRS  not “red” or “orange” 1  358  903  1,261 
  Not in CHRS 147  1,090  66,381  67,618
 Total 323  1,996  68,969  71,288
 
Third, the analysis also uses a variety of other geographic data for the city including Chicago’s 
community areas and Census TIGER files.  To link properties to their block-group level Census 
variables, the Geolytics™ dataset is employed to produce boundary-constant neighborhood 
demographics for 1990-2000.  The Geolytics™ Neighborhood Change Database is used to get 
tract-level measures of demographics and housing in 1970 for use as instruments.  
 
The empirical model common to hedonic property analyses (Rosen 1974) takes the semi-log 
form: 
 lnP = α + βX + δDESIGNATION + εit          ( 4 )  
where X is a vector of property attributes and neighborhood quality measures, and 
DESIGNATION represents designation status, the discrete analogue to the index r from the 
theoretical model above.  The problem of endogeneity arises if, for example, designation status 
tends to be conferred on properties with unexpectedly high (or low) sale prices.  Given the 
explicit concern about impacts on designees’ sale prices apparent in Chicago’s landmark 
ordinance, the possibility of endogenous designation is worth exploring. As shown above, valid 
instruments will be those variables in z that predict r but do not belong in X.  The first-stage of 
   the two-stage least squares regression essentially estimates r
* using X and instruments z that are 
excluded from X in estimating the second-stage, equation (4).  This provides consistent estimates 
of δ and permits a better understanding of why landmark designations occur where they do.  
Table 2 lists the variables used in estimating equation (4) along with their definitions and 
descriptive statistics. 
 
Identifying price effects of landmark preservation policies in this setting poses noteworthy 
challenges and opportunities.  First, due to the rarity of individual building designations (even in 
a landmarks program as vibrant as Chicago’s), the data only permit robust estimations of district 
designations’ price effects.  The final sample has 284 sales in individually designated landmark 
buildings, 272 of which are in five different buildings.  This makes it difficult to distinguish 
between the effect of building-specific unobservables and the individual designation effect.  
Fortunately, enough variation exists for district designations.  Second, although previous 
research tends to focus on the effects of designation on a property’s own price (Coulson and 
Leichenko 2001 and Ahlfeldt and Maennig 2009 are notable exceptions), the external effects of 
historic preservation – effects of designation on nearby property prices – remain arguably the 
most important effect of the policy.  Even if the own-price effect of designation is negative, 
preservation policies can still be justified on positive externality grounds.  Including measures of 
proximity to landmarks in X in equation (4) allows the recovery of amenity (or disamenity) 
effects of designation.  This avoids the limited overlap between the home sales data and the 
landmarks inventory because the nearby landmarks include all landmarks (e.g., Douglas Tomb, 
St. Ignatius High School, Robie House), regardless of their housing a home sale during the 
1990s.  The external price effects of landmark building designation are thus recoverable, even if 
its own-price effects are not. 
   Table 2:  Definitions and descriptive statistics 
Variable Definition  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
lnP  ln (real sales price, adjusted to 1 January 2000 $ using Chicago’s 
housing CPI deflator)  11.898 0.659
DISTRICT  in a landmark district at time of sale?  0.036 0.186
LANDMARK  in a designated landmark building (not a district) at time of sale?  0.004 0.060
CountLmk  number of landmark buildings in block-group, exclusive of property's 
own status, at time of sale  0.328 0.748
DistShare  share of block-group’s land area inside a landmark district, exclusive 
of property's own district, at time of sale  0.033 0.096
named  sale property is in building in CHRS that has a building name (e.g., 
"The Overton Building")  0.009 0.094
OTH  sale property is in CHRS not as “red” or “orange”  0.009 0.095
RO  sale property is coded "red" or "orange" in CHRS  0.044 0.205
CHRS100  count of CHRS properties within 100 meters  4.174 8.158
CHRS250  count of CHRS properties within 250 meters  27.079 38.886
CHRS500  count of CHRS properties within 500 meters  96.138 115.992
lnarea  ln (area of unit in feet
2) (see footnote 9)  7.103 0.417
yearbuilt  year built (see footnote 9)  1956.792 26.924
unitbldg  number of units in the building  150.405 231.928
rooms  number of rooms  4.743 1.690
bedrms  number of bedrooms  1.866 0.801
baths  number of baths  1.553 0.659
mbbth  master bathroom dummy  0.489 0.500
fireplace  number of fireplaces  0.313 0.515
garage  garage dummy  0.368 0.482
parking  garage or parking dummy  0.884 0.320
parkspot  parking spot dummy  0.172 0.377
waterfront  on the waterfront  0.072 0.258
distCBD  distance to CBD in km  6.953 5.023
distLake  distance to Lake Michigan in km  1.989 3.125
distwater  distance to closest water (river, lake) feature, in km  0.876 0.804
distCTA  distance to closest CTA rail line in km  0.737 0.695
distpark  distance to closest park in km  0.416 0.332
northside  on the north side of the city  0.916 0.277
latitude  decimal degrees north  41.929 0.050
income  median household income (in $1000s), block-group, 1990   33.083 21.964
college  percent with a college degree, block-group, 1990   0.476 0.224
medValue  median house value (in $1000s), block-group, 1990  219.804 168.199
popdens  population density (1000s/km2), block-group, 1990  33.923 23.893
white  percent white, block-group, 1990  0.721 0.234
medyrblt  median year built for residences, block-group, 1990  1953.018 13.458
new const.  percent of housing units built in last 10 years, block-group, 1990  0.094 0.150
saleyear  year of sale  1995.375 2.812
OwnOcc70  percent of housing units occupied by owner, tract, 1970  0.281 0.322
VacRat70  percent of housing units vacant, tract, 1970  0.087 0.059
LongRes70  percent of housing units with occupants moving in before 1960, 
tract, 1970  0.197 0.110
NewOne70  percent of housing units built in last 1 year, tract, 1970  0.043 0.066
 
 
   V. Results 
 
OLS Results 
First, the results of simple OLS regressions are presented.  Table 3 reports the main results from 
these regressions across a number of specifications of the hedonic price equation.  Column 1 of 
Table 3 presents the results from a fairly naïve regression of landmark district status and property 
characteristics on log real sales price.  These results suggest large price premiums 
(approximately 25%) for homes in preserved districts.
9  (The premium rises to 60% in a totally 
unconditional model where only DISTRICT is included and all other hedonic attributes are 
omitted.)  Although homes in districts sell for a premium over comparable homes, and homes in 
districts tend to have nicer attributes than non-district homes, districts are inherently spatial and 
thus geographic controls become vital.  Column 2 adds geographic and local neighborhood 
demographic controls.  As a result, the price premium for properties in landmark districts falls to 
roughly 2% (with a p-value of 0.06).  The coefficients on the property characteristics are 
unsurprising.  Controls for geographic position of the structure relative to major features of the 
landscape and census block-group demographics also exhibit generally expected signs.  Nicer 
homes are in districts, and districts are in nicer neighborhoods.  In this sense, these historic 
preservation districts appear to be “picking winners.”  Failing to control for both housing 
attributes and geography can severely distort the effects of landmark districts.  Controlling for 
them, the premium falls much closer to zero. 
 
While the effect of designation on the price of the designated home is certainly important, 
landmark designation usually has other aims.  In some senses, the primary rationale for 
preservation is that the threatened historic properties embody positive externalities overlooked 
                                                 
9 Following Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980), percent effects of dummy variables like designation status are derived 
from the expression: exp(β) – 1. 
   by private interests when considering redevelopment.  These historical spillovers should be 
captured at least partly by neighboring property values.  Column 3 includes counts of 
(individually designated) landmarks in the home’s block group and a measure of the share of the 
home’s block group’s land area that is occupied by another landmark district.  Column 3 shows 
sizable effects of proximity to landmark districts and rapidly diminishing returns to nearby 
landmark buildings.  A ten percent increase in the nearby land area within a district is associated 
with a 2.1% rise in property values.  Having one landmark nearby is associated positively with 
price, but additional individual landmarks beyond that actually diminish property values.  
Properties sold inside of districts receive a roughly 2% premium after controlling for proximity 
to other nearby designations.   
 
Even though the results in column 3 of Table 3 show a smaller price effect of districts than the 
prevailing literature on price effects of historic preservation efforts
10, one important source of 
bias in the estimator is the possibility that the landmark variables are correlated with unobserved 
historic quality.  The landmarks commission may be selecting properties to designate based on 
characteristics not controlled for in column 3.  As designation itself need not actually affect the 
historic quality – it seeks to prevent the decline of existing historic quality, not create new 
quality – the risk of “picking winners” rather than “making winners” is particularly high here.  If 
historic quality has a positive or negative market valuation, and designated properties are more 
“historic” than non-designated structures, then part of the designation effect reflects a pre-
existing historic value that was not created by designation, only correlated with it.  The model in 
                                                 
10 Notably, Noonan’s (2007) Table 3 shows positive price effects for Chicago districts, and Noonan (2007). Coulson 
and Lahr (2005) find 14 – 23% effects for Memphis districts.  Coulson and Leichenko (2001) and Leichenko et al. 
(2001) find 5 – 20% price effects for individual designations in Texas.  Coulson and Leichenko (2001), and Ahlfeldt 
and Maennig (2009) estimate (universally) positive price effects from proximity to other designated properties. The 
OLS model in Noonan (2007) for Chicago data finds a 9% price effect for landmark and a 5% effect for district.   
   column 4 leverages the measures of historic quality available for the roughly 17,000 properties 
deemed sufficiently historically significant to include in the CHRS.  Measures of the properties 
own historical quality (its color code ranking and whether it has a known name like “The Smith 
Building”) and measures of the nearby density of historical properties (counts of CHRS 
properties within several buffers) are included in the model for column 4.  As a result, the own-
price effect of DISTRICT gets much stronger, the price effect of nearby districts actually grows 
more positive, and the external price effect of nearby landmark buildings remains virtually 
unchanged.  The bias from omitting historic significance suggests that neighborhoods with high 
density of historic significance are less valued by the market and thus downwardly bias the 
district effect.  Controlling for nearby historical properties does little to affect the price effects of 
proximity to individual landmarks but, like the bias for DISTRICT, removes a downward bias on 
the effect of nearby landmark districts.  Interestingly, CHRS properties generally sell for a 
premium and that premium is slightly less for red- or orange-coded buildings.  This likely arises 
from the CHRS surveyors downgrading color rankings for properties that have undergone 
renovations, which are presumably valuable to owners.  Named buildings appear to sell for 
substantial premium.  Being nearby CHRS properties has mixed effects on property values.  
Homes sold with more CHRS properties very nearby are generally unaffected, those in the 
middle buffer range suffer a price penalty, and homes embedded in a larger (500m) community 
with more historic properties receive a small premium.   
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The sensitivity of the implicit prices of landmark variables to controls for historical quality 
marks an important contribution to the previous work, which has generally failed to include 
   objective measures of historical quality distinct from official designation (Noonan 2007, Coulson 
and Lahr 2005).  In column 4, the inclusion of controls for a building’s historic quality has a 
significant impact on the DISTRICT coefficient.
11  For landmark districts in Chicago, the 
omitted-variable bias appears most strong when geographic and neighborhood quality variables 
are absent.  Neighborhood historic quality may predict which properties receive landmark status.  
There is evidence of external effects of a historic preservation policy, a major justification for the 
policies, although the nonlinearity complicates matters. 
 
2SLS Results 
While the results in Table 3 are informative, the discussion in the theoretical section above 
suggests that taking the OLS coefficients as policy effects – even in the face of so many control 
variables – is not necessarily justified.  Many unobserved factors that affect the sales price might 
also affect the probability that a property is designated.  Chief among these would be a poorly 
observed historic quality or maintenance level in older properties.  While Noonan (2007) and 
Coulson and Lahr (2005) attempt to deal with this problem via a repeat-sales or first-differenced 
model, the approach here uses instrumental variables.  Table 4 presents estimates of a hedonic 
price equation similar to the model presented in column 4 of Table 3 estimated using a two-step 
efficient GMM IV estimator (with standard errors robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity).  As 
described above, the instruments are selected from the interaction of a neighborhood demand (for 
historic preservation) shifter and a measure of historic quality around the property being sold.  
The neighborhood demand variable is percent of housing that is owner-occupied measured at the 
tract-level in the 1970 census, which immediately followed the passage of the Landmarks 
                                                 
11 If column 4 in Table 3 also included a LANDMARK variable, the price premium for properties in individually 
designated buildings is not significantly different from zero and other effects are essentially the same.  The 
LANDMARK coefficient is also insignificant in a column 3 model.   
   Ordinance but predates sales by at least two decades.  The historic quality variables are (a) 
named, an indicator for the property’s historic significance, and (b) CHRS100, indicating the 
historic density around the home, both measured by the CHRS that largely predates property 
sales.  Conditional on the many controls for neighborhood quality and historic density, the 2SLS 
hedonic assumes that the interactions are valid exclusions and that they predict the likelihood of 
being designated in a landmark district.  The (difference-in-Sargan) C statistic confirms that 
DISTRICT is endogenous in the OLS price equation at the 0.01% level. 
 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The first column of Table 4 presents results for the price equation for the two-stage GMM IV 
estimator of the preferred model.  The other columns provide sensitivity tests and are discussed 
in the following subsection.  In column 1, the instruments predict DISTRICT status well, with 
named homes or homes nearby more historic resources being more likely to have been 
designated in landmark districts if the share of owner-occupied housing in the tract in 1970 was 
higher.  This is as expected, where higher owner-occupancy rates predict greater demand for 
district designations.  Diagnostic tests for weak instruments, discussed in more detail below, all 
point to strong instruments.  Most of the coefficients on the exogenous variables do not change 
very much from column 4 of Table 3 to column 1 of Table 4.  Controlling for the endogeneity in 
DISTRICT does lead to larger premiums for CHRS homes (of any color code) and to smaller 
price effects for nearby landmark districts.  Having more CHRS properties within 100 meters is 
now also an amenity.  One interpretation is that unobservables correlated with designation in the 
OLS model, and purged in the 2SLS model, are also correlated with designees’ historical quality 
and proximity to other landmarks.    
    
The effects of district designation in this model differ markedly from the OLS estimates.  
Designations affect price in at least two ways: (internally) affecting designees’ prices and 
(externally) affecting neighbors.  First, there is no evidence of positive own-price effects from 
district designation.  These estimates in column 1 of Table 4 suggest that the effect of being 
included in a historic district on sales price is negative 19% (with a 95% confidence interval 
ranging from -29% to -7%).  The large district effect likely reflects several forces.  On the one 
hand, inclusion in a historic district restricts redevelopment options of owners (and buyers), 
which should lower the value of the property.  On the other hand, district designation may offer 
many benefits, like tax benefits and possibly a kind of certification of (or signal for) the 
property’s cachet.  For attached housing in Chicago, at least, the tax benefits are outweighed by 
the restrictions on renovation.  The cachet effects also appear minimal given the model with 
excellent controls for historical quality.  Buildings with names in the CHRS sell for a 6% 
premium on top of a 5-8% premium for being in the CHRS.  Furthermore, the stability that 
district designation brings to the neighborhood’s overall character (in terms of the types of land 
uses and buildings’ external appearance) may be seen as disamenities by buyers in districts.  
Homes in districts may relatively lack access to modern urban conveniences like shopping, 
parking, and other mixed uses.     
 
Second, external price effects of landmarks might affect those near to landmarks.  Conditional on 
the historical nature of the neighborhood, important price effects from proximity to officially 
designated landmarks are shown in Table 4.  There are clearly external price effects of more 
landmark buildings and districts in a home’s neighborhood above and beyond the 
neighborhood’s collection of historic buildings.  Having a district (that does not contain the 
   home) in the block group at the time of sale is associated with higher property values 
proportional to the size of that district.  Every 10% of the block group occupied by a district 
predicts a 2% increase in sale price for all homes in that block group.  This significant positive 
spillover likely arises for many of the same reasons outlined earlier.  Being near a stable historic 
district with its intangible benefits but none of the restrictions is an important local amenity.
12  
Moreover, insofar as district designation imposes constraints on the supply of new housing 
within the district, demand may be diverted to areas just outside of the district boundaries.  Both 
improving nearby neighborhood quality and shifting demand to these areas can account for the 
positive DistShare effect in the 2SLS model.
13   
 
Having an individually designated landmark building (that does not contain the sold home) in the 
home’s block group confers a modest (3%) price premium for the first landmark.  That premium 
reflects a rapidly diminishing return to landmark buildings nearby such that homes with two or 
more landmarks in their block group actually sell at a sizeable discount from otherwise 
comparable properties.  The story about the external effects of historical quality and landmark 
preservations is thus somewhat mixed.  Being in historically significant communities and near 
landmark districts suggests price premiums, while the price advantages of close proximity to 
individual landmark buildings become disadvantages when landmark density is high.  The 
                                                 
12 Families search for a certain kind of neighborhood might be attracted by landmark districts for their old-time 
neighborhood “feel” and stronger “social fabric” (New York Landmarks Conservancy 1977).  Time-constrained 
families may restrict their housing search to nearby such neighborhoods, increasing the demand for homes just 
outside of districts.  Other intangible benefits for the area have been remarked on by Schaeffer and Millerick (1991) 
and Asabere and Huffman (1994a). 
13 If being near districted properties increases prices for non-districted properties, then presumably it would also 
increase prices for districted ones as well.  The coefficient on DISTRICT, consistently negative across models, 
suggests that any such positive external effect is outweighed by negative effects associated with being subject to 
district regulations, on average.  This interpretation of the results in Table 4, critical for appreciating the relative 
magnitude of the negative internal and positive external price effects, suggests that district designations have weaker 
“amenity” affects than their redevelopment constraint effects. 
   external benefits of individual landmarks likely depend on neighborhood context.  Regardless, 
there is no clear evidence that designating individual landmarks carries universally positive 
spillovers, while being in or near landmark districts is associated with higher prices.
 
 
The external effects of historical quality and preservation policies are also evident in column 1 of 
Table 4.  Having more historical properties in the larger community (between 250 and 500 
meters) increases sale price, more historical properties in in the middle buffer distance (between 
100 and 250 meters) decreases price, and more CHRS buildings in the closest buffer is not 
significantly related to price .  This is all on top of the strong positive effect of median housing 
age of the observation’s block group as part of the control variables.   
 
Robustness 
To assess the robustness of the 2SLS estimator in column 1 of Table 4, the validity of the 
exclusion restrictions and the strength of those instruments must be examined.  Appropriate 
instruments must not belong in the price equation and also be closely correlated with the 
endogenous (DISTRICT) variable.  The theory outlined in Section III suggests that the interaction 
between historic quality measures and key 1970s demographics should predict designation yet 
not also belong in the price equation.  Conditional on the many controls already in the hedonic 
specification, there is no reason to suspect these interaction terms are relevant hedonic attributes.  
The model in column 1 of Table 4 is overidentified (two instruments, one endogenous regressor), 
so that tests of the overidentifying restrictions – or of instrument exogeneity – are possible.  
Table 4 presents Hansen’s J statistic.  Although robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity, Hansen’s J 
may lack power against the null that the instruments are valid (i.e., uncorrelated with the error 
   term in equation (4)).  The J statistic in all the models in Table 4 is not significant at 
conventional levels, consistent with exogenous instruments.   
 
The strength of the instruments in the first stage is supported by the diagnostic statistics shown in 
Table 4.  Table 4 reports the first-stage coefficients for the IVs.  Column 1’s model exhibits very 
strong IVs as discussed above.  Table 4 also reports the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen-
Paap statistic.  This statistic addresses concerns that weak IVs may bias the second-stage 
estimates (Stock and Yogo 2005).  The large values, 53.0 in column 1, exceed the double-digit 
“benchmark” often mentioned, thus indicating very strong instruments and should allay concerns 
about irrelevant IVs. 
 
Another check on the robustness of the IV approach employs an alternative set of IVs.  The 
second-stage results should remain mostly unchanged when a different valid set of IVs is used.  
Column 2 of Table 4 shows the results of such an estimation.  There, the two instruments are (a) 
the interaction between the property’s historic quality (the named variable, taken from the CHRS 
and hopefully minimally sensitive to any post-designation and pre-survey maintenance effects) 
and new construction (share of the housing stock built in the last year) in the tract measured in 
1970, and (b) the interaction between historic density (measured by CHRS100) and residential 
turnover (share of the households in the same home five years earlier) in the tract circa 1970.  
The idea is that historically notable neighborhoods or buildings in areas with less turnover will 
be less likely to become designated in a district since the relatively stable neighborhood requires 
less protection.  The first-stage results in column 2 bear out this expectation.  The J statistic fails 
to reject the exogeneity assumption and the Kleibergen-Paap statistic again points to very strong 
instruments.  The 23% price discount observed in Column 2 is quite close to the column 1 results 
   using different instruments, lending still more confidence to the results.  Estimates for the other 
regressors are substantively similar as well.  Armed with four potential instruments, the model in 
column 3 reports the GMM estimator with all four instruments.  Again, the instruments 
collectively appear strong and exogenous, and the coefficients of interest change minimally.   
 
Using the larger instrument set allows testing of another interesting hypothesis.  A second 
endogenous regressor, the years elapsed since the property was initially designated in a district, 
is added to the model in column 3.  Here, the IV diagnostics are a bit more suspect: the J statistic 
of 6.83 has a p-value of 0.03 casting doubt on the validity of the instruments, although the 
Kleibergen-Paap statistic of 49.45 suggests strong instruments.  The price effect for DISTRICT is 
-0.11 (z = -1.89) and the time-elapsed interaction coefficient is -0.023 and is statistically 
significant (z = -4.01).  These results point to the possibility that the district discount or “penalty” 
grows larger over time, perhaps as properties become further outdated.  The implicit prices for 
the exogenous variables are qualitatively similar to those in column 3, except for the DistShare 
effect, which become essentially zero. 
 
Finally, the possibility of building-specific unobservables is explored.  One interpretation of the 
endogeneity evident in the OLS model (column 4, Table 3) is that unobservables remain 
correlated with district designation.  While a repeat-sales estimator can address this, this comes 
at a high cost in terms of drastically reduced sample size and the maintained assumption that 
time-varying unobservables play no role.  Noonan (2007) nonetheless estimates a repeat-sales 
model and accordingly loses the ability to identify the effects of designation on the price of the 
sold property itself.  The 2SLS approach here avoids the reduced sample but lacks controls for 
time-invariant unobservables.  Building-specific unobservables can be factored out via a fixed-
   effects model (at the cost of only 3,249 observations that are singletons for their building or 
street address).  The addition of building fixed effects eliminates the building-level 
unobservables correlated with DISTRICT, but policy endogeneity may yet remain (e.g., if rapidly 
appreciating buildings tended to become designated).   
 
The fixed-effect model identifies district effects by using effectively only observations from 
buildings that had sales before and after a district designation.  Thus, different results in the 
fixed-effect model and those reported in Table 4 may derive either from controlling for important 
building-specific unobservables, identification using far fewer districts, or both.
14  Where district 
designations vary rarely within building, this approach suffers from many of the same limitations 
as Noonan (2007).  Nonetheless, it presents an interesting robustness check.  In the fixed-effect 
context, the instruments need to predict the timing of a sale (before or after designation) rather 
than whether a building will become designated.  The interaction between RO, the change in 
block-group income from 1980 to 1990, and saleyear captures this risk of designation (RO × 
∆income) and timing of sale.  A second instrument uses a different demand-shifter, percent 
college educated, but is otherwise the same.   
 
The results of the fixed-effect estimator appear in column 4 of Table 4 and provide further 
support for the model in column 1.  The results for the property attributes (e.g., rooms, baths) are 
quite similar.  The geographic, neighborhood, and CHRS variables are all dropped from this 
model because they are building-specific and time-invariant.  Interestingly, the instrumented 
price effect of DISTRICT in this model is -37% (z = -2.78).  While this reinforces the earlier 
results, the effects of proximity to other landmarks reverse.  The price effect of nearby landmarks 
                                                 
14 The subsample receiving a DISTRICT treatment shrinks from 2,143 units in 18 different districts in Table 3 and 
the rest of Table 4 to 217 units in just three different districts. 
   becomes much weaker and convex rather than concave.  In a similar reversal, DistShare has a 
large negative effect (-0.64) that is statistically significant.  Hansen’s J of 0.28 offers little reason 
to doubt the exogeneity of these instruments.  The instruments both positively and significantly 
predict district status in the first stage as expected, although their Kleibergen-Paap statistic of 
22.32 raises some concern about bias from the relatively weak instruments.  
 
Despite the consistency of results and the strength of the diagnostic statistics reported in Table 4, 
there is still some concern for the sensitivity of these results.  Alternative instruments with 
weaker theoretical justification and typically more troublesome diagnostic statistics are available 
and yield substantively different results.  The low power of Hanson’s J test also advises caution.  
Moreover, clustering errors at the building level greatly inflates the standard errors, especially 
for the DISTRICT variable and the variables from the CHRS, leaving many of the effects 
insignificant.  (The external effects of landmark designations remain significant.)  A more 
cautious interpretation of these findings is just that no robust evidence of positive own-price 
effects from landmarks is found.  
 
VI.  Conclusion 
After developing a simple theoretical model that casts doubt on the exogeneity of policy 
variables and helps to identify some plausible instruments, this paper demonstrates the value of 
correcting for policy endogeneity in hedonic price analyses by using a more robust estimator 
with richer data than previous studies of the implicit price of historic landmark designation.  OLS 
estimation of the hedonic price model offers results consistent with much of the previous 
literature, namely that property values are higher in historic districts.  The rich data allow 
unprecedented controls of historic quality, neighborhood quality, and property attributes.  
   Surprisingly, controlling for historical observables has an upward influence on the estimated 
price effect of DISTRICT in OLS.  The external effects of district designations are positively 
affected by better controls for neighborhood historic quality (and individual designations’ 
spillover is virtually unchanged) in OLS.  The better test for this kind of omitted variable bias 
makes use of the 2SLS model, however.  Unfortunately, omitting the historic attributes prevents 
estimation of the 2SLS model without replacement instruments.
   The vital role of historical 
quality in the OLS and 2SLS models demonstrates how careful analysis of the impact of historic 
preservation policies depends on controls for existing historic quality.
15
 
Most critically, the endogeneity of district designation status is explored using instruments 
derived from a simple model of regulator behavior.  The empirical results provide some robust 
evidence that previous methods may be particularly vulnerable to endogeneity and omitted 
variable biases in this context.  Although Noonan (2007) attempts to overcome the omitted-
variable problem with a repeat-sales model, akin to mitigating endogeneity with a difference-in-
difference estimator, our approach here explicitly accounts for the endogeneity in a IV 
framework.  The IV approach has an advantage in being able to identify implicit prices for 
designation when designations rarely occur between observed sales.  The variable of interest, 
historic district designation status, is found to be endogenous.  The IV approach also allows for 
the explicit estimation of the determinants of designation in the sample.  For a variety of 
instrument sets that leverage the historic quality measures from the CHRS, the first-stage results 
point to strong instruments whose predicted impacts are consistent with theory.  In the 2SLS 
                                                 
15 Identifying a policy effect without controls for historical quality poses a serious challenge for researchers.  In 
some contexts, like the NRHP but not Chicago’s landmarks, eligibility is tied to a threshold structure age like “50 
years”.  Such arbitrary cutoffs suggest that a regression discontinuity design might identify policy effects even with 
very limited information about historic quality.  We leave that to future research. 
   hedonic, robust estimates of the “own” price effect of historic designation are shown to be large 
and negative for landmark districts.   
 
The effects of designation on nearby properties are shown to be statistically significant and 
substantively important.  Unlike previous literature, the number of historic landmark buildings 
designated in a neighborhood appears nonlinearly associated with prices even in the 2SLS 
framework.  The first nearby landmark has a positive spillover, but subsequent neighborhood 
landmarks appear to be disamenities.  Proximity to districts also affects price.  In the aggregate, 
these external effects are quite substantial.  For Chicago, roughly two-thirds of sales are in block 
groups with no other landmark districts or buildings – leaving a third of the properties in the 
neighborhood of landmarks.  19% of the units in the sample have a district in their neighborhood, 
conferring sizable price premiums.  (With DistShare’s mean of 0.20 among those units 
neighboring districts, they enjoy an average +4% spillover.).  Of all sales, 13% have one 
landmark building in their block group, also conferring sizeable premiums.  Importantly, 
however, over 8% of sold units have two or more landmark buildings and thus many properties 
“near” landmark buildings actually experience negative spillovers from these designations.  
These negative spillovers can be economically important; condo and townhome prices positively 
correlate with landmark density.
16
 
                                                 
16 As a very crude estimate, using coefficients in column 1 of Table 4 and assuming that the sample of sales is 
representative of Chicago’s housing, removing all landmark buildings would lower home values by $263 on average 
(winners gain $14,320 on average while losers lose $4,899 on average and greatly outnumber the winners).  
Similarly, removing all districts would lower home values by $45 on average (winners gain $59,203 average while 
losers lose $10,804 on average and again greatly outnumber the winners).  Seen in this redistributive light, the 
historic preservation policy appears to concentrate the harms of designation while spreading the gains widely.  The 
combined effect of landmark buildings and districts shown here has a small net positive effect ($309 is roughly 0.2% 
of mean home value).  This net effect masks how roughly 7% of the units would gain by the absence of landmarks 
by 13% of their property value, but they are outnumbered by 4:1 by those whose home values would suffer without 
the landmarks by 4%.  Large values are at stake for the 35% of the units that are either winners or losers in Chicago. 
   While the OLS price effects presented here are noticeably smaller than have been found 
elsewhere, none of the previous work has directly addressed policy endogeneity.  Correcting for 
the endogeneity in the hedonic price model yields large, negative price effects.  Controlling for 
historic quality can affect the substantial external price effects as well.  Caution is warranted in 
interpreting these price premiums.  First, there is still some possibility that these effects are 
artifacts of unobserved quality.  Second, the hedonic price describes the marginal price effect of 
designation, not a welfare effect.  In first-stage hedonics, changing prices may result as much 
from altering demand (by displacing it elsewhere) or shifts in supply.  Given the nature of 
landmark district designation (i.e., preserving neighborhoods and hence constraining supply), the 
lower prices for homes in districts suggests that the restrictions on property use are indeed 
lowering demand for the housing assets.  These lower prices may be indicative of a takings 
common to preservation laws where a few individuals suffer costly encumbrances on their 
property for the sake of positive external benefits.  An interesting extension for future research 
would be to explore the progressivity of such a policy given the positive correlation between 
property value and designations. 
 
Evaluating a preservation policy involves several aspects.  First, there is the effect of the policy 
on the preserved buildings – including effects on historical quality preserved and property 
values.  Next, there is the effect of the preservation policy on the surrounding properties and 
neighborhood – including on neighborhood dynamics and property values.  If preservation policy 
has increased the supply of the historic resource in a city, then some of the credit for the external 
effects of historic structures belongs to the policy.  Preservation policy, however, might not 
increase the total amount of the historic resource especially if it is perceived as a taking.  
Preserving heritage that already exists is not the same as increasing supply.  As Turnbull (2002) 
   has shown, the threat of “preservation” can speed owners towards redevelopment, which could 
lead to an overall decrease in historic resources (even if the policy itself effectively preserves the 
properties it does designate).  These more dynamic effects of preservation policy on the stock of 
historic properties in a city have received no attention to our knowledge, mostly because good 
data on the stock of historic resources in an area do not exist.  These dynamic effects could play 
critical roles in the general efficiency of preservation programs and on the optimal administration 
of these programs when they are enacted.  Even a more robust approach to estimating “own” and 
external price effects of landmark preservation, such as that presented here, does little to answer 
the larger question of “how do preservation policies affect the stock of historic buildings?” 
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   Table 3: OLS Regression Results  
  1 2 3 4 
  Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
DISTRICT 0.2209***
  21.64  0.0156*
  1.92 0.0217***
  2.65 0.1139 
*** 10.22
CountLmk    
  0.0708***
  12.45 0.0729 ***
  12.73
CountLmk
2    
  -0.0318***
  -16.12 -0.0314 ***
  -15.88
DistShare    
  0.2131***
  13.54 0.3935 ***
  20.55
named         0.0418 ***
  3.64
OTH         0.0330 ***
  3.55
RO         0.0219 **
  2.38
CHRS100         -0.0002 
  -0.90
CHRS250         -0.0014 ***
  -15.48
CHRS500         0.0001 ***
  4.69
lnarea 0.6835***  17.69  0.5497***  16.12 0.5471***
  16.07 0.5434 ***
  16.03
yearbuilt 0.0009***  12.64  0.0002***  2.89 0.0002***
  3.07 0.0003 ***
  4.35
unitbldg 0.0002***  13.16  -0.0001***  -5.24 -0.0001***
  -5.87 -0.0001 ***
  -7.10
unitbldg
2 -1.4E-08***  -6.13  1.3E-08***  4.58 1.4E-08***
  4.86 1.6E-08 ***
  5.53
rooms -0.0087***  -3.45  0.0167***  4.31 0.0170***
  4.33 0.0173 ***
  4.39
bedrooms -0.0122*  -1.74  0.0799***  5.73 0.0802***
  5.74 0.0802 ***
  5.73
baths 0.2545***  24.32  0.1752***  17.68 0.1733***
  17.53 0.1708 ***
  17.38
mbbth 0.1168***  22.70  0.0610***  16.48 0.0600***
  16.20 0.0599 ***
  16.29
fireplace 0.1390***  22.51  0.0508***  11.25 0.0521***
  11.61 0.0538 ***
  12.09
garage -0.0003  -0.05  -0.0250***  -6.29 -0.0226***
  -5.69 -0.0236 ***
  -5.99
parking 0.1552***  20.62  0.1035***  18.58 0.1050***
  18.85 0.1052 ***
  18.92
parkspot -0.1198***  -20.63  -0.0707***  -16.75 -0.0708***
  -16.77 -0.0730 ***
  -17.36
saleyear 0.0300***  33.83  0.0390***  58.48 0.0398***
  59.84 0.0393 ***
  59.30
waterfront     0.0093*  1.72 0.0068
  1.27 0.0042 
  0.78
distCBD     -0.0709***  -22.61 -0.0745***
  -23.45 -0.0761 ***
  -23.62
distCBD
2     0.0014***  20.51 0.0014***
  18.55 0.0014 ***
  18.63
distLake     0.0223***  10.03 0.0242***
  10.92 0.0266 ***
  11.84
distLake
2     0.0000  0.42 0.0002*
  1.75 0.0001 
  0.78
distwater     0.0268***  5.20 0.0237***
  4.56 0.0335 ***
  6.22
distwater
2     -0.0083***  -7.44 -0.0085***
  -7.57 -0.0100 ***
  -8.72
distCTA     0.0408***  8.40 0.0472***
  9.38 0.0378 ***
  7.55
distCTA
2     -0.0051***  -4.96 -0.0070***
  -6.16 -0.0062 ***
  -5.58
distpark     -0.1697***  -11.77 -0.1725***
  -12.01 -0.1462 ***
  -10.21
distpark
2     0.1841***  15.12 0.1917***
  15.84 0.1628 ***
  13.49
northside     122.7497***  5.23 70.2282***
  3.02 59.8161 **
  2.56
latitude     2.0346***  7.08 1.3450***
  4.72 1.0167 ***
  3.52
north.×latitude     -2.9267***  -5.22 -1.6721***
  -3.01 -1.4229 **
  -2.55
income     0.0012***  8.88 0.0007***
  5.50 0.0004 ***
  3.28
medyrblt     -0.0063***  -37.52 -0.0058***
  -33.67 -0.0057 ***
  -32.58
medValue     0.0000***  4.27 0.0000***
  3.40 0.0001 ***
  7.95
white     0.2590***  24.12 0.2534***
  23.58 0.2454 ***
  22.90
popdens     -0.0001*  -1.92 -0.0004***
  -5.52 -0.0004 ***
  -5.07
college     0.0476***  3.91 0.0543***
  4.45 0.0906 ***
  7.20
new const.      0.4103***  33.51 0.3968***
  32.40 0.3689 ***
  30.03
constant -55.2298***
  -29.78  -143.6637***
  -12.02 -117.4465***
  -9.93 -103.1579 ***
  -8.61
R
2 0.6108 0.7938 0.7955 0.7975 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively 
   TABLE 4: 2SLS Results 
   1    2   3    4  
  coef.    z  coef.    z coef.    z coef.    z 
DISTRICT -0.2092  ***  -3.04 -0.2607 *** -4.26 -0.2862 *** -5.13  -0.4698 *** -2.78 
CountLmk 0.0653  ***  10.73 0.0636 *** 10.67 0.0641 *** 10.75  -0.0236 *  -1.71 
CountLmk
2 -0.0310 ***  -15.51 -0.0307 *** -15.39 -0.0311 *** -15.54  0.0084 **  2.51 
DistShare 0.2092  ***  4.77 0.1790 *** 4.47 0.1659 *** 4.44  -0.6380 *** -3.55 
named 0.0545  ***  4.46 0.0557 *** 4.56 0.0570 *** 4.62     
OTH 0.0795  ***  5.68 0.0865 *** 6.56 0.0918 *** 7.15     
RO 0.0431  ***  4.20 0.0465 *** 4.59 0.0486 *** 4.85     
CHRS100 0.0013  ***  3.19 0.0016 *** 4.07 0.0017 *** 4.68     
CHRS250 -0.0008  ***  -5.13 -0.0007 *** -4.85 -0.0007 *** -4.74     
CHRS500 0.0001  ***  4.97 0.0001 *** 5.11 0.0001 *** 4.91     
lnarea 0.5492  ***  16.04 0.5500 *** 16.09 0.5508 *** 16.08  0.2588 *** 12.63 
yearbuilt 0.0001  **  1.96 0.0001 *  1.65 0.0001 *  1.67  0.0000   -0.15 
unitbldg -0.0001  ***  -6.67 -0.0001 *** -6.63 -0.0001 *** -6.39  0.0000   0.95 
unitbldg
2 1.6E-08 ***  4.97 1.6E-08 *** 4.88 1.6E-08 *** 4.76  -9.7E-10   -0.28 
rooms 0.0177  ***  4.43 0.0177 *** 4.45 0.0177 *** 4.44  0.0166 *** 4.03 
bedrooms 0.0795  ***  5.68 0.0794 *** 5.69 0.0793 *** 5.68  0.1409 *** 9.05 
baths 0.1742  ***  17.51 0.1748 *** 17.61 0.1750 *** 17.61  0.1680 *** 15.33 
mbbth 0.0588  ***  15.63 0.0585 *** 15.52 0.0588 *** 15.57  0.0413 *** 13.47 
fireplace 0.0544  ***  12.03 0.0545 *** 11.98 0.0548 *** 12.03  0.0029   0.73 
garage -0.0257  ***  -6.42 -0.0255 *** -6.36 -0.0260 *** -6.47  -0.0578 *** -17.53 
parking 0.1055  ***  18.76 0.1052 *** 18.64 0.1048 *** 18.54  0.0904 *** 19.38 
parkspot -0.0737  ***  -17.43 -0.0736 *** -17.34 -0.0735 *** -17.31  -0.0807 *** -25.74 
saleyear 0.0399  ***  58.87 0.0399 *** 59.08 0.0399 *** 59.01  0.0396 *** 66.76 
waterfront 0.0133  **  2.34 0.0144 **  2.53 0.0163 *** 2.89 
distCBD -0.0808  ***  -25.01 -0.0793 *** -24.54 -0.0872 *** -27.27 
distCBD
2 0.0014 ***  18.82 0.0014 *** 18.73 0.0014 *** 19.17 
distLake 0.0291  ***  12.84 0.0283 *** 12.53 0.0325 *** 14.41 
distLake
2 0.0001 ***  1.27 0.0001   1.13 0.0002 *** 1.81 
distwater 0.0297  ***  5.47 0.0285 *** 5.20 0.0292 *** 5.35 
distwater
2 -0.0100 ***  -8.72 -0.0097 *** -8.42 -0.0105 *** -9.11 
distCTA 0.0502  ***  9.20 0.0510 *** 9.52 0.0564 *** 10.66 
distCTA
2 -0.0081 ***  -7.07 -0.0080 *** -6.97 -0.0092 *** -8.12 
distpark -0.1536  ***  -10.56 -0.1546 *** -10.62 -0.1556 *** -10.68 
distpark
2 0.1700 ***  13.85 0.1710 *** 13.92 0.1727 *** 14.05 
northside 12.4060    0.53 26.4439   1.12 -42.5372 *  -1.82 
latitude 0.5760  **  1.99 0.7829 *** 2.70 -0.0057   -0.02 
north.×latitude -0.2914    -0.52 -0.6267   -1.11 1.0204 *  1.83 
income 0.0012  ***  5.46 0.0000 *** 6.44 0.0000 *** 6.98 
medyrblt -0.0058  ***  -32.67 -0.0058 *** -32.63 -0.0058 *** -32.65 
medValue 0.0001  ***  7.70 0.0000 *** 7.57 0.0000 *** 7.78 
white 0.2358  ***  21.60 0.2361 *** 21.69 0.2271 *** 20.87 
popdens -0.0005  ***  -6.03 0.0000 *** -6.00 0.0000 *** -6.59 
college 0.0494  ***  3.18 0.0427 *** 2.87 0.0407 *** 2.79 
new const.  0.3970  ***  29.63 0.4009 *** 29.67 0.4032 *** 30.49 
   constant  -85.4505  ***  -7.11 -93.9996 *** -7.79 -61.0558 *** -5.10 
N 59642      59642     59642     56623
centered R
2 0.7932     0.7917     0.7909     0.6043
   Kleibergen-
Paap rk Wald 
F statistic  53.044      259.811     156.710     22.316
Hansen J  0.829    p=0.36 1.675 p=0.20 5.067 p=0.17  0.285 p=0.59 
First-stage results                           t    t  t 
CHRS100× 
    OwnOcc70  0.0095  ***  7.19      0.0072 *** 5.89 
named× 
    OwnOcc70  0.0534  **  2.41      0.0380 *  1.82 
CHRS100× 
    LngRes70       0.0270 *** 15.94 0.0241 *** 12.90 
named× 
    NewOne70        -1.0588 *** -14.99 -0.8108 *** -16.90   
RO×∆Col70×  
         saleyear              0.0207 *** 6.40 
RO×∆Inc70×  
         saleyear              0.0099 *** 6.66 
 
 
   